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Wage Rigidity and Job Creation
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Standard macroeconomic models underpredict the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. A 
common solution is to assume wages are rigid. We explore whether this explanation is 
consistent with the data. We show that the wage of newly hired workers, unlike the aggregate 
wage, is volatile and responds one-to-one to changes in labor productivity. In order to 
replicate these findings in a search model, it must be that wages are rigid in ongoing jobs but 
flexible at the start of new jobs. This form of wage rigidity does not affect job creation and 
thus cannot explain the unemployment volatility puzzle. 
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This paper documents that wages of newly hired workers out of non-employment strongly
respond to aggregate labor market conditions. In the context of a labor market that is
characterized by search frictions, the wage of newly hired workers is important because
new hires are the ￿ marginal￿workers that a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions to create jobs. The wage
of workers in ongoing jobs on the other hand, does not ￿ uctuate much. Since there are
many more workers in ongoing jobs than new hires, this makes the aggregate wage rigid.
To document these facts, we construct time series for the wage of various subgroups of
workers from the CPS, the largest publicly available US micro-dataset that allows to
make this distinction.
Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008) showed that a business cycle version of
the search and matching model falls severely short of replicating labor market dynam-
ics. In particular, for commonly used calibrations of the model, the predicted volatility
of labor market tightness and unemployment is much lower than observed in the data.
Shimer argued that period-by-period Nash bargaining over the wage leads wages to re-
spond strongly to technology shocks, dampening the e⁄ect of these shocks on expected
pro￿ts and therefore on vacancy creation. He suggested wage rigidity as a mechanism
worth exploring to amplify the response of vacancy creation and unemployment to tech-
nology shocks.
Hall (2003) proposed a model of unemployment ￿ uctuations with equilibrium wage
stickiness, in which wages are completely rigid when possible and rebargaining takes
place only when necessary to avoid match destruction (either through a layo⁄ or a
quit). In Hall￿ s model there is a unique market wage, which implicitly extends this
rigidity of wages on the job to wages of newly hired workers. A large number of more
recent papers have appealed to some form of wage rigidity to improve the performance
of labor market models with search frictions to match the business cycle facts in the
data (Costain and Reiter 2008; Menzio 2005; Rudanko 2008; Farmer 2006; Moen and
Rosen 2006; Braun 2006; Gertler and Trigari 2006; Blanchard and Gal￿ 2008; Kennan
2008; Hall and Milgrom 2008; Shimer 2009).
Few economists would doubt the intuitive appeal of this solution. A simple supply
and demand intuition immediately reveals that technology shocks lead to larger ￿ uctu-
ations in the demand for labor if wages are rigid. Furthermore, it is a well documented
fact that wages are less volatile than most models of the business cycle predict.1 Using
individual-level panel data on wages, several studies document evidence for wage rigidity
(Bils 1985, Solon, Barsky and Parker 1994, Beaudry and DiNardo 1991).
We argue, however, that the empirically observed form of wage rigidity does not
generate additional volatility in employment and vacancies. The argument goes in two
steps. First, we present new evidence that wages of newly hired workers are volatile and
respond one-to-one to changes in productivity. We also ￿nd that wages for ongoing job
relationships are indeed rigid over the business cycle, as in previous studies. Second, we
1Like the observation that employment (or total hours) is more volatile than predicted by the model,
this is true for Real Business Cycle models, search and matching models as well as new Keynesian
models.
2show that in order to replicate these ￿ndings in a search model, we need to assume that
wages in ongoing jobs are rigid but at the start of a job are set in a perfectly ￿ exible
manner. This kind of wage rigidity does not a⁄ect job creation. Thus, there is evidence
for wage rigidity, but not of the kind that leads to more volatility in unemployment
￿ uctuations.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to to construct a large, representative dataset
of wages for newly hired workers out of non-employment. We use data on earnings and
hours worked from the Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation groups to
calculate wages. We match the outgoing rotation groups to the basic monthly data ￿les
and construct four months employment history for each individual worker. We use these
micro-data to construct quarterly time series for a wage index of new hires and workers
in ongoing jobs and explore the cyclical properties of each series. After controlling for
composition bias, we ￿nd an elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity of 0:8
for new hires and 0:2 for all workers.
Previous empirical studies on wage rigidity by macroeconomists have been concerned
with aggregate wages (Dunlop 1938, Tarshis 1939, Cooley 1995). If the importance
of wages of new hires has been recognized at all, then a careful empirical study has
been considered infeasible because of lack of data.2 This practice has given rise to the
conventional wisdom that wages ￿ uctuate less than most models predict and that the
data would therefore support modeling some form of wage rigidity.
Labor economists who have studied wages at the micro-level have mostly been con-
cerned with wage changes of individual employees. Thus, the analysis has naturally
been restricted to wages in ongoing employment relationships, which have been found
to be strongly rigid. Notable exceptions are Devereux and Hart (2006) and Barlevy
(2001) who both study job changers and ￿nd their wages to be much more ￿ exible than
wages of workers in ongoing jobs. Pissarides (2007) surveys these and other empirical
micro-labor studies and concludes that wages of job changers respond much stronger to
unemployment than wages of workers in continuing employment relationships.
The main di⁄erence between these studies and ours, is that we focus on newly hired
workers, i.e. workers coming from non-employment, which is the relevant wage series for
comparison to standard search models, rather than job-to-job movers. Since wages of
non-employed workers are not observed, we need to use a di⁄erent estimation procedure,
which does not require individual-level panel data. Our procedure has the additional
advantage that we can use the CPS, which gives us a much larger number of observations
than the earlier studies, which use the PSID or NLSY datasets.
Like previous research, we ￿nd strong evidence for composition bias because of worker
heterogeneity. Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) show that failing to control for (poten-
tially unobservable) heterogeneity across workers leads to a substantial downward bias
in the cyclicality of wages. We document the cyclical patterns in the di⁄erences between
new hires and the average worker in demographics, experience and particularly in the
2Hall (2005) writes that he does ￿not believe that this type of wage movement could be detected in
aggregate data￿(p.51). More speci￿cally, Bewley (1999) claims that ￿there is little statistical data on
the pay of new hires￿(p.150).
3schooling level that cause this bias. Controlling for ￿ uctuations in the skill level of the
workforce is particularly important for our purposes since we study newly hired workers
and at least some of the composition bias is likely to be driven by selection in the hiring
process. This constitutes a potential weakness of our approach, because we cannot take
individual-speci￿c ￿rst di⁄erences and thus cannot control for unobservable components
of skill as Solon, Barsky and Parker do. However, we use the PSID to demonstrate that
controlling for observable skill is su¢ cient to control for composition bias. While unob-
servable components of skill might be important, they are su¢ ciently strongly correlated
with education to be captured by our controls.
It is possible that not only the workers that are hired di⁄er between recessions and
booms, but the types of jobs that are created are di⁄erent as well. In particular, there
is some evidence that matches created in a boom pay higher wages and last longer than
matches created in a recession (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, Davis, Haltiwanger and
Schuh 1996). In this paper, we do not address this issue for two reasons. First, we
argue that the correct wage series to compare to one-sector models of the labor market
is an aggregate time series. If there is heterogeneity across sectors in the amount of
wage rigidity, the model behaves fundamentally di⁄erent depending on the assumption
one makes about the type of heterogeneity and the movement of labor between sectors.
We postpone this interesting issue for future research. Second, since the CPS does not
contain information on job characteristics, it is impossible to control for heterogeneous
jobs in the same way we control for heterogeneous workers. The only thing we can do is
to take a weighted average of the wage of new hires, constructing the weights such that
the sample of newly hired workers is representative for the whole labor force in terms
of industry and occupation. Keeping industry composition constant, the elasticity of
the wage of new hires with respect to productivity drops substantially, but is still much
higher than for workers in ongoing jobs.3
A ￿nal di⁄erence between this paper and the existing literature is that we focus on
the response of wages to changes in labor productivity, whereas previous studies have
typically considered the correlation between wages and the unemployment rate. With a
search model, in which ￿ uctuations are driven by exogenous changes in labor productiv-
ity but unemployment ￿ uctuations are endogenous, our statistic is the more interesting
one.4 The elasticity of the wage to labor productivity has a natural interpretation in a
wide range of models. It is not necessary for example, that changes in labor productivity
are driven by technology shocks. Our estimates have the same interpretation for any
shock that does not a⁄ect wages directly, but only through changes in productivity, e.g.
government expenditure shocks or monetary policy shocks. We explore the robustness
of our estimates to alternative measure of productivity and ￿nd very similar results. If
3Recently, researchers have identi￿ed datasets that allow to simultaneously control for worker and
￿rm heterogeneity. Carneiro, Guimarªes and Portugal (2008) use matched employer-employee data for
Portugal 1986-2005 and ￿nd that, controlling for composition bias due to both sources, entry wages are
much more procyclical than wages in ongoing jobs, consistent with our estimates.
4Moreover, as pointed out by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), since we are ultimately interested
in the predictions of the model for unemployment ￿ uctuations, the calibration targets, including the
cyclicality of wages, should not depend on unemployment. We discuss this issue further in section 3.
4we use unemployment rather than productivity as our regressor, we ￿nd similar esti-
mates to those of Barlevy (2001) and Devereux and Hart (2006) for job changers. This
indicates that the wage of new hires out of non-employment behaves similar to that of
job-to-job movers and lends additional credibility to our estimates.
Our second contribution is to point out the implications of our ￿ndings for the
unemployment volatility puzzle. In the standard stochastic search and matching model
as in Shimer (2005), the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity is close to
one. We refer to this model, in which wages are set period-by-period through Nash
bargaining, as the ￿ exible wage model.5 In order to match our estimate for the average
wage elasticity of all workers, we need to assume that wages are rigid in ongoing job
relationships. By rigidity we mean any kind of constraint on the wage bargaining process
that implies that the division of match surplus between worker and ￿rm shifts in favor
of workers in periods when the surplus is small.
Theory suggests several reasons why wages of newly hired workers should vary more
strongly with productivity than wages of workers in ongoing employment relationships.
Beaudry and DiNardo￿ s (1991) model of implicit wage contracts is a good illustration
of the type of wage rigidity that we believe to be plausible. Upon the start of a work-
relationship the bargaining parties are relatively free in their wage determination. How-
ever, once the contract has been signed, wages can no longer be changed very much,
in order to insure the worker against ￿ uctuations in her income. In addition, internal
labor markets can give rise to almost deterministic wage increases for continuing work-
ers (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994). Many other theories of wage rigidity, because
of e¢ ciency wages (Yellen 1984), unions (Oswald 1985), motivational concerns (Bewley
1999) or simply because rebargaining is costly, all provide plausible explanations for why
wages are not changed very often during the relationship, but do not seem to apply to
newly hired workers.
Wage rigidity in ongoing jobs has no e⁄ect on job creation and unemployment ￿ uc-
tuations in the standard search and matching model. What matters for employment
dynamics is not the aggregate wage in the economy, but the wage of the marginal work-
ers that are being hired. Formally, when ￿rms decide on whether or not to post a
vacancy, they face a trade-o⁄ between the search costs (vacancy posting costs) and the
expected net present value of the pro￿ts they will make once they ￿nd a worker to ￿ll the
job. Thus, what matters for this decision is the expected net present value of the wage
they will have to pay the worker they are about to hire. How this expected net present
value is paid out over the duration of the match, is irrelevant (Boldrin and Horvath 1995,
Shimer 2004, Kudlyak 2007). Previous studies that have used wage rigidity to explain
the unemployment volatility puzzle, have either extended the rigidity to newly formed
matches (Hall 2005, Gertler and Trigari 2006) or ￿nd very small e⁄ects (Rudanko 2008).
What do our results imply for the unemployment volatility puzzle? We show that
there is no need to assume rigidity in the wage of newly hired workers in order to match
the wage data. Based on our estimates, we cannot rule out a moderate degree of rigidity
5The number depends on the calibration. For example, if workers￿bargaining is very low, as in
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the elasticity is much lower, although wages in that model are ￿ exible.
5in the wages of these workers, like for example the bargaining setup in Hall and Milgrom
(2008), which reduces the in￿ uence of the value of unemployment on the outcome of the
wage bargain. Neither can we rule out a calibration as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
that relies on a wage elasticity slightly smaller than one in combination with a very small
match surplus. In fact, we ￿nd some evidence that the response of wages of new hires
to changes in productivity is smaller in the period before the Great Moderation. In the
post 1984 period however, we ￿nd no evidence for rigidity in the wage of new hires and
in the expected net present value of wage payments for newly created jobs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
our dataset and comment on some of its strengths and weaknesses. We also provide
a comparison of new hires and workers in ongoing jobs in terms of observable worker
characteristics. In section 3, we focus on the cyclical properties of the wage and present
our estimates of the elasticity of the wage of new hires with respect to productivity.
We also discuss how we control for composition bias and explore the robustness of our
results. Section 4 discusses the implications of our ￿ndings for macroeconomic models
of the labor market. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The prevailing opinion in the macro literature is that no data are available to test the
hypothesis that the wage of new hires might be much more ￿ exible than the aggregate
wage (Bewley 1999, Hall 2005). Some anecdotal evidence seems to point against it.6 To
our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst attempt to construct data on the aggregate wage
for newly hired workers based on a large dataset that is representative for the whole US
labor market.
2.1 Individual-level data from the CPS
We use data on earnings and hours worked from the CPS outgoing rotation groups from
the BLS (2000), a survey that has been administered every month since 1979 which
allows us to construct quarterly wage series for the period 1979￿ 2006.7 However, in most
6According to Bewley, not only ￿there is little statistical data on the pay of new hires￿ (1999,
p.150), but in addition, ￿the data that do exist show little downward ￿ exibility.￿ The data he refers
to are average starting salary o⁄ers to college graduates in professional ￿elds collected by the College
Placement Council. While suggestive, these data are hardly representative for the labor force as a whole.
Bewley also cites evidence in favor of wages of new hires being more ￿ exible from Baker, Gibbs and
Holmstrom (1994), who show that the average real pay of newly hired managers declined in recessions,
even as the wage of existing employees continued to increase.
Some interesting additional suggestive evidence in favor of ￿ exibility in the wage of new hires comes
from Simon (2001). Simon documents that during the Great Depression, from 1929 to 1933, wages
asked from situations-wanted ads for female clerical workers fell by almost 58%, much more than wages
of existing female o¢ ce workers (17.6%). However, Simon also argues that the wages o⁄ered to workers
that were actually hired, although more ￿ exible than wages paid to existing workers, fell by much less
than wages asked and interprets his ￿ndings as evidence that employers rationed jobs. We are grateful
to Emi Nakamura for drawing our attention to this paper.
7The BLS started asking questions about earnings in the outgoing rotation group (ORG) surveys in
1979. The March supplement goes back much further (till 1963), but does not allow to construct wage
6of the paper we focus on the post Great-Moderation period 1984￿ 2006. Wages are hourly
earnings (weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for weekly workers) corrected
for top-coding and outliers and de￿ ated using the de￿ ator for aggregate compensation
in the private non-farm business sector.
We match workers in our survey to the same individuals in three preceding basic
monthly data￿les. This allows us to identify newly hired workers as those workers that
were not employed for at least one of the three months before we observe their wage.8
In addition, we have information on worker characteristics (gender, age, education, race,
ethnicity and marital status), industry and occupation.
We restrict the sample to non-supervisory workers between 25 and 60 years of age in
the private non-farm business sector but include both men and women in an attempt to
replicate the trends and ￿ uctuations in the aggregate wage. In an average quarter, we
have wage data for about 25 000 workers, out of which about 19 000 can be classi￿ed to
be in ongoing job relationships. The details on the data and the procedure to identify
job stayers and new hires are in Appendix A.
Figure 1 plots the number of new hires as a fraction of the total number of workers
over time. On average, about 8% of employed workers found their job within the current
quarter. This fraction seems to have been higher in the 1980s then in the later part of
the sample. There is a clear cyclical pattern, with the fraction of new hires substantially
higher in recessions.9 In the quarter with the smallest fraction, we still have about 7% or
1300 newly hired workers. The only exceptions are the third and fourth quarter of 1985
and 1995. In these quarters, we cannot match individuals to the preceding four months
because of changes in the sample design so that all our series that require workers￿
employment history in the previous quarter will have missing values in those quarters.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for some observable characteristics of workers and
the evolution of some of these characteristics over time can be found in Figure 2. Clearly,
newly hired workers are not representative for the labor force. New hires are more likely
to be female, and much more likely to be African-American or hispanic. They are also
slightly younger and therefore have less labor market experience.10 Finally, new hires
series at higher frequencies than annual. The same is true for the May supplement, the predecessor of
the earnings questions in the ORG survey.
8Abowd and Zellner (1985) show there is substantial misclassi￿cation in employment status in the
CPS and provide correction factors for labor market ￿ ows. Misreporting of employment status also
a⁄ects our results. A worker who, at some point during the survey period, incorrectly reports not to be
employed will be classi￿ed as new hire by our procedure. Hence, such misreporting implies that some
workers who are actually in ongoing relationships will appear in our sample of new hires. Given our
argument that the wage of new hires reacts stronger to productivity ￿ uctuations, such misreporting will
bias the estimates against our result.
9This countercyclical pattern may be surprising compared to Shimer￿ s (2007) ￿nding that the hiring
rate is strongly procyclical. The di⁄erence is because the hiring rate (or job ￿nding rate) is the ratio of
new matches over the number of unemployed workers, whereas here we plot the ratio of new matches
over the number of employed workers. We could retrieve the job ￿nding rate by multiplying the series in
￿gure 1 by a factor (1 ￿ u)=u, where u is the unemployment rate, which is a strongly procyclical factor.
10If we include workers under 25 years old, the di⁄erence in experience becomes much larger. In this
sample, new hires have an average experience level of 14.0 years, compared to 19.5 years for all workers
because workers that ￿nd their ￿rst job are classi￿ed as new hires. For this reason, we exclude young
7have on average a year less schooling than the average for all workers. It is not surprising
therefore, that new hires on average earn much lower wages. These numbers suggest
that workers with lower wages also tend to work in higher turnover jobs, which makes
them more likely to have recently started a new job in any given quarter.
2.2 Construction of the wage index
Workers are heterogeneous and newly hired workers are not a representative subsample
of the labor force. If the composition of newly hired workers varies over the business
cycle, then this heterogeneity will bias our estimate of wage cyclicality. Solon, Barsky
and Parker (1994) show that this composition bias is substantial and that failing to
control for changes in the composition of employed workers over the cycle makes wages
seem less cyclical than they really are.
Taking into account individual heterogeneity, the wage wijt of an individual worker
i at time t, depends in part on worker i￿ s individual characteristics and in part on a
residual that may or may not depend on aggregate labor market conditions.
logwit = x0
i￿ + log ^ wit (1)
Here, xi is a vector of individual characteristics that is constant or else varies determin-
istically with time, like age, and ^ wijt is the residual wage that is orthogonal to those
characteristics.
Following Bils (1985), the standard approach in the micro-literature has been to work
with ￿rst di⁄erences of the wage, so that the individual heterogeneity terms drop out.
However, taking ￿rst di⁄erences of individual wages limits the analysis to workers that
were employed both in the current and in the previous period and thus does not allow
to consider the wage of newly hired workers. Therefore, we take a di⁄erent approach
and proxy xi by a vector of observables: gender, race, marital status, education and
a fourth order polynomial in experience. We know from an extensive literature on the
return to schooling, that these variables explain a substantial part of the idiosyncratic
variation in wages, see e.g. Card (1999).
To obtain composition-bias corrected wages, we regress log wages on observable
worker characteristics and take the residuals. Since we are interested in the comove-
ment of wages with aggregate labor market conditions, we then aggregate by averaging
these residuals by quarter for di⁄erent subgroups of workers (e.g newly hired workers
or workers in ongoing jobs).11 Thus, the wage index for subgroup j, ^ wjt, relates to the
average wage of that group of workers, wjt, as follows,
log ^ wjt = logwjt ￿ (xjt ￿ ￿ xj)
0 ￿ (2)
where xjt is the average of the vector of observable characteristics for that subgroup of
workers in each quarter and ￿ xj denotes the sample average xj. Notice that even if an
workers from our baseline sample. The averages for the other characteristics are similar in both samples.
11We consider average log wages to be consistent with the aforementioned micro-literature, although
our results are robust for log average wages as well.
8individual worker￿ s characteristics are time-invariant, the average characteristics for a
group of workers may vary with time because the composition of the group changes.
2.3 Volatility of wages
Figure 3 plots the wage index for workers in ongoing jobs and for newly hired workers.
In order to focus on ￿ uctuations at business cycle frequencies, we bandpass ￿ltered
the series to show only ￿ uctuations with periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters. For
comparison, the bottom graphs present the average log wage of these subgroups without
correcting for composition bias, and each graph also shows the corresponding wage index
for all employed workers.
The ￿ uctuations in wages of workers in ongoing job-relationships look very similar
to the ￿ uctuations in the average wage of all employed workers. Neither series is very
volatile and neither shows a clear comovement with the NBER business cycle dates. The
wage of newly hired workers, however, is much more volatile than the aggregate wage.
To formalize this observation, Table 2 presents standard statistics for the volatility
and persistence of various wage series. We present these statistics for detrended data
using the bandpass ￿lter and the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. We have also corrected the
statistics for the sampling error in the wage series that are constructed from the CPS,
which biases the second moments, see Appendix B.
The standard deviation of the wage of new hires is about 40% higher than for the
wage of all workers and an F-test overwhelmingly rejects the null that the two variances
are equal. The wage of new hires is also somewhat less persistent. The wage for stayers
looks consistently very similar to the wage of all workers, because of the fact that in
any given quarter, the vast majority of workers are in ongoing job relationships. These
results are not speci￿c to the ￿lter used for detrending. Also, our conclusions are the
same, and often even starker, if we use the median instead of the mean wage for each
group. This is our ￿rst piece of evidence that the wage for newly hired workers is less
rigid than the aggregate wage.
3 Response of wages to productivity
We now focus on a particularly relevant business cycle statistic: the coe¢ cient of a
regression of the log real wage index on log real labor productivity. This statistic has a
natural interpretation as a measure of wage rigidity: if wages are perfectly ￿ exible, they
respond one-for-one to changes in productivity, whereas an elasticity of zero corresponds
to perfectly rigid wages.
As pointed out by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the elasticity of wages with
respect to productivity is a better summary statistic for calibrating the search model
than the correlation or elasticity of wages with other variables, like the unemployment
rate, vacancies or labor market tightness. There are at least two reasons for this. First, in
the model, other labor market variables are endogenous, but productivity is exogenous.
Therefore, a regression of log wages on log productivity will deliver an unbiased estimate
of the elasticity. Second, the coe¢ cient of a regression of wages on unemployment or
9vacancies is inversely proportional to the variance of these variables. If we are evaluating
the performance of the model to match these variances, then we do not want to target
them in the calibration.
3.1 Estimation
In the context of this paper, there are additional advantages of using the elasticity
rather than the correlation of wages with productivity. Our wage series are subject to
(intertemporally uncorrelated) measurement error. This biases the volatility of wages
and therefore their correlation with other variables (see Appendix B). In a regression,
however, measurement error in the dependent variable does not bias the coe¢ cient.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient has a clear causal interpretation as an elasticity, it is straight-
forward to calculate standard errors, and we can easily control for other factors that
a⁄ect wages, if necessary.
In order to avoid a spurious estimate of the elasticity if wages and productivity are
integrated, we estimate our regression in ￿rst di⁄erences.
￿log ^ wjt = ￿j + ￿j￿logyt + "jt (3)
where ^ wjt is a wage index that controls for changes in the skill composition of the
worker pool as in (2), j denotes the subgroup of workers (e.g. new hires) and yt is labor
productivity. Estimating in ￿rst di⁄erences has the additional advantage that we do not
have to detrend the data using a ￿lter, which changes the information structure of the
data and therefore makes it harder to give a causal interpretation to the coe¢ cient.
Notice that ^ wjt in equation (3) is itself an estimate from the underlying individual
level wage data. Previous studies on the cyclicality of wages, starting with Bils (1985),
have collapsed the two steps of the estimation procedure into one, and directly estimated
the following speci￿cation from the micro data.
￿logwijt = ~ ￿j + ~ ￿j￿logyt + ~ "ijt (4)
where wijt is the uncorrected wage of individual i, belonging to subgroup j, at time t,
as in (1). However, since the wage last quarter is unobserved for newly hired workers
(because they were not employed then), this approach is not feasible for our purpose.
Therefore, we implement our procedure as a two-step estimator and estimate (3) from
aggregate wage series.
The main methodological di⁄erence between our study and previous work, which
allows us to explore the cyclicality in the wage of newly hired workers, is that we
use the ￿rst di⁄erence of the average wage, rather than the average ￿rst di⁄erence
of the wage, as the dependent variable. This raises the question whether our approach
to control for composition bias using observable worker characteristics is su¢ cient to
control for all worker heterogeneity. To explore this issue, we re-estimated the results in
Devereux (2001), the most recent paper that is comparable to ours. For this purpose,
we use annual panel data from the PSID and apply the same sample selection criteria
10as Devereux does.12
The ￿rst column of Table 3 replicates Devereux￿ s (2001) estimate of the response
of the wage of workers in ongoing relationships to changes in the unemployment rate.13
This response is estimated as in Devereux, from equation (4) using a two-step procedure.
First, we take ￿rst di⁄erences for the wage of individual workers and average those by
year. In the second step, we regress the annual averages of the change in the wage
on the ￿rst di⁄erence of the unemployment rate.14 The second column presents the
same elasticity, estimated directly from the micro-data in a 1-step procedure, clustering
the standard errors by year. As expected, this leaves both the point estimate and the
standard error virtually unaltered.
We now try to re-estimate these numbers using the 2-step estimation procedure we
use for the CPS, ￿rst aggregating wages in levels and then estimating the elasticity in
￿rst di⁄erences. This procedure, which fails to control for composition bias, gives a very
di⁄erent point estimate, making the wage look less cyclical. However, when we include
controls for education and demographic characteristics in the ￿rst step, the estimate in
column 4 is once again very close to that in Devereux (2001). Surprisingly given that
our procedure is less e¢ cient than the one used by Devereux, we even get virtually the
same standard error, suggesting the e¢ ciency loss is small and we conclude that our
procedure to control for individual heterogeneity using observable worker characteristics
works well in practice.
3.2 Newly hired workers out of non-employment
Estimation results for the elasticity of the wage of new hires with respect to productivity
are reported in Table 4. The regressions in this table include quarter dummies to control
for seasonality but are otherwise as in equation (3). For each regression, we report the
estimate for the wage elasticity ￿j, its standard error and the number of quarterly
observations.
The elasticity of the wage of new hires with respect to productivity is much higher
than the elasticity of the wage of all workers. The wage of new hires responds almost
one-to-one to changes in labor productivity, with an elasticity of 0:79 in our the baseline
12We are grateful to Paul Devereux for making his data available to us. To our knowledge, Devereux
(2001) is the most recent paper with estimates comparable to ours from the PSID. Devereux and Hart
(2006) use UK data. Barlevy (2001) regresses wages on state-level unemployment rates and includes
interactions of the unemployment rate with unemployment insurance. Other more recent papers (Grant
2003, Shin and Solon 2007) use the NLSY. While the NLSY may be well suited to explore some interesting
questions closely related to the topic of this paper (in particular, the cyclicality of the wage of job
changers because of the much larger number of observations for this particular group of workers), it is
not a representative sample of the US labor force.
13Previous studies have typically focused on the response of wages to unemployment as a cyclical in-
dicator rather than productivity. Since here we are interested in evaluating the estimation methodology,
we follow this practice for comparability.
14Devereux includes a time trend, experience and tenure as additional controls in the second step. In
order to exactly replicate his estimates, we do the same. However, excluding these second step controls
changes the estimates very little, indicating that ￿rst di⁄erencing in the ￿rst step largely takes care of
heterogeneity across workers along these dimensions.
11estimates. The point estimates are never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one and often
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Thus, we do not ￿nd evidence for wage rigidity in the
wage of new hires.
If hours per worker cannot be freely adjusted, one may argue that output per person
and earnings per person provide better measures of wages and labor productivity. Re-
sults for these measures are also presented in Table 4 and provide a very similar picture
as the hourly data. The results are also similar or even strengthened if we use median
instead of mean wages or if we weight the regression by the inverse of the variance of the
￿rst step estimates to obtain the e¢ cient second step estimator, see Table 5. Finally, the
results are robust to di⁄erent sample selection criteria for constructing average wages
from the CPS, see Table 6.
3.2.1 Composition bias
Controlling for composition bias is crucial for our results. This is particularly true for
newly hired workers, whose wage is more sensitive to changes in the composition of the
unemployment pool. In Table 7, we present alternative estimates if we control only for a
subset of observable components of skill. Not controlling for skill, reduces the elasticity
of the wage of new hires from 0:79 to about 0:54.
We ￿nd that education is by far the most important component of skill. Not control-
ling for education gives an estimate that is similar to the elasticity we get if we do not
control for skill at all. Controlling for experience or demographic characteristics has a
much smaller e⁄ect on the elasticity. To our knowledge, this result is new. Whereas the
importance of composition bias was well known, we document that it is largely driven
by education level of unemployed workers, or at least by some component of skill for
which the education level is a good proxy.
3.2.2 Wage response by gender and age groups
Much of the micro-literature on wage cyclicality has focused on male workers, arguing
that female workers may be more loosely attached to the labor market. While we believe
that for our purposes, including both genders provides the correct comparison for the
model predicted behavior of wages, in Table 8 we explore how this choice a⁄ects our
results. The response of wages to productivity is substantially higher for men, although
the di⁄erence is never signi￿cant. The di⁄erences are particularly large for newly hired
workers. Thus, focusing on male workers only would further strengthen our evidence
that wages of new hires are ￿ exible.
Table 8 also presents some estimates including workers from a larger age range in the
sample. In our baseline results, we focus on workers between 25 and 60 years old in order
to exclude workers on their ￿rst job as well as workers close to retirement. Particularly
excluding the young workers is important for our result. Adding workers between 20 and
25 years old to the sample, the elasticity of the wage of new hires decreases substantially,
although not signi￿cantly. The result seems more robust to including older workers
between 60 and 65 years old, with the elasticity remaining virtually unaltered. We
12argue that the behavior of both young and old workers is not described well by a simple
model of labor supply and the correct comparison between model and data is to limit the
analysis to workers that are in the middle of their career. To make sure we have set our
age limits stringent enough, the last rows of the table present results based on workers
between 30 and 45 years of age only. Since the sample size goes down substantially, the
standard errors increase but the point estimates are almost identical.
3.2.3 Exogenous changes in productivity
Our baseline productivity measure is output per hour. As Hall (2007) has recently
pointed out, the average and marginal product of labor are proportional to each other if
the production function is Cobb Douglas and, under this assumption, output per hour
is the appropriate measure of productivity to calculate elasticities. For our purposes, it
is irrelevant what drives changes in productivity. The estimates have the same inter-
pretation for any shock that does not a⁄ect wages directly, but only through changes in
productivity. However, if labor productivity is endogenous, then the causal interpreta-
tion of the e⁄ect of productivity on wages is lost.
The most prominent possibility of endogeneity in labor productivity are diminishing
returns to labor. In this case, the marginal product of labor is proportional to total factor
productivity, but the factor of proportionality depends on employment. And since we
are not sure what drives ￿ uctuations in employment, this might introduce a spurious
correlation between productivity and wages. To explore whether this type of endogeneity
is important, we construct a measure of exogenous changes in log productivity, that is
given by log output minus 1 ￿ ￿ times log hours, where 1 ￿ ￿ is the labor share in a
Cobb-Douglas production function. If capital is ￿xed, this measure is proportional to
total factor productivity (TFP).15 As a more precise measure of TFP, we also use the
quarterly version of the Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) series, constructed by Fernald
(2007).
Since total factor productivity is arguably an exogenous source of ￿ uctuations in
labor productivity, we use these measure of TFP to instrument output per hour in our
regressions. The results are presented in Table 9. For all instruments, our results become
stronger and the elasticity of the wage of newly hired workers is now very close to unity.
3.3 Job-to-job changers
Throughout this paper, we have focused on newly hired workers out of non-employment.
We argue that this is the relevant group of workers to compare to a standard search and
15Suppose production requires capital and labor and is of the Cobb-Douglas form with diminishing




t , where At is total factor productivity, Kt is capital and Lt is total
hours. Log total factor productivity equals logAt = logYt ￿￿logKt ￿(1 ￿ ￿)logLt, whereas log labor
productivity is given by logyt = logYt￿logLt = logAt+￿logKt￿￿logLt. This illustrates the problem
of endogenous ￿ uctuations in total hours. If what we are interested in is total factor productivity,
then log labor productivity is endogenous because of the ￿logLt term. Ignoring ￿ uctuations in the
capital stock, which are small compared to ￿ uctuations in labor at high frequencies, we can construct
a quarterly productivity series corrected for endogenous ￿ uctuations in total hours as log ~ yt = logYt ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)logLt = logyt + ￿logLt.
13matching model. However, as argued by Pissarides (2007), job-to-job movers, although
not strictly comparable to a model without on-the-job search, may also be informative
about wage ￿ exibility of new hires. Some previous studies explored the cyclicality of
wages of this group of workers (Bils 1985; Devereux and Hart 2006; Barlevy 2001, see
also Pissarides 2007 for a survey of these and other papers). Compared to new hires out
of non-employment, job-to-job changers are an attractive group to study because one
can control for composition bias by taking an individual-speci￿c ￿rst di⁄erence.
To compare our results to those studies, we replicate and extend some of the results
in Devereux (2001). Using annual panel data from the PSID, 1970-1991, Devereux ￿nds
an elasticity of the wage of all workers to changes in the unemployment rate of about ￿1
and for job stayers of about ￿0:8. These estimates are replicated in Table 10. Devereux
does not report the cyclicality of job changers, but this elasticity can readily be estimated
using his data and is also reported in the Table. With an elasticity of ￿2:4, the wages
of job changers are much more cyclical than those of all workers.
When we replace the right-hand side variable in these regressions with labor pro-
ductivity, we ￿nd estimates that are very well in line with our baseline results. With an
elasticity of about 0:96, the wage of job changers responds almost one-to-one to changes
in productivity. The wage of all workers is slightly more responsive than in our baseline
estimates (this may be due to the di⁄erence in the sample period), but is much less
cyclical than the wage of job changers.16
Finally, we check whether there might be systematic di⁄erences between the PSID
and the CPS by estimating the cyclicality in the wage of job changers from our CPS
data. After 1994, the CPS asks respondents whether they still work in the same job
as at the time of the last interview one month earlier. We use this question to identify
job changers and ￿nd the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 10. Since we can only
use data since 1994, the standard errors of these estimates are very large. The point
estimates however, are well in line with the estimates from the PSID.
We ￿nd that the wage of job-to-job movers responds similarly to changes in labor
market conditions as the wage of newly hired workers out of non-employment and -if
anything- is even more cyclical. Intuitively, this makes sense. A story of wage rigidity
that is based on rigidity in ongoing job relationships would a⁄ect neither new hires out
of non-employment nor job-to-job movers. To the best of our knowledge, this result
was not known before. It justi￿es the exercise in Pissarides (2007), to use the wage of
job changers as a proxy for the wage of newly hired workers out of unemployment to
calibrate a search and matching model without on-the-job search.
3.4 Great moderation and pre-1984 wage rigidity
Although our data starts in 1979, all estimates we presented so far were based on the
1984-2006 sample period. The reason is that around 1984 various second moments,
16Notice that the sample size of job changers in the PSID is very small and the standard error of the
elasticity of the wage of job changers to changes in productivity is much larger than our baseline estimate
for the response of new hires out of non-employment, despite the fact that the estimation procedure in
the PSID is more e¢ cient, see section 3.1.
14relating to volatility but also to comovement of variables, changed in the so called Great
Moderation (Stock and Watson 2003). The change in the comovement seems to be
particularly relevant for labor market variables, see Gal￿ and Gambetti (2007).
As opposed to virtually all other macroeconomic aggregates, the volatility of wages
did not decrease around the Great Moderation. This is true for the aggregate wage as
well as for the wage of newly hired workers, see Table 2. We now explore whether the
response of wages to productivity changed in this period.
Table 11 presents the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity for our
baseline sample 1984-2006 as well as for the full period for which data are available,
1979-2006.17 Even though we add only 5 years of data to the sample, wage respond
substantially less to changes in productivity over the full sample than in the post 1984
period. The ordering of the response of the wages of the various groups of workers
is unchanged: the wage of new hires responds more than the average wage, the wage
of workers in ongoing jobs less. However, now even the wage of newly hired workers
responds substantially less than one for one to changes in labor productivity. Like our
baseline results, these estimates are robust across di⁄erent measures of productivity,
di⁄erent sample selection criteria and di⁄erent ways to calculate the wage series or to
estimate the elasticity.
These ￿ndings provide some evidence for wage rigidity prior to 1984 and a ￿ exibi-
lization of the labor market during the Great Moderation. And because there seems
to have been rigidity in wages of newly hired workers as well as in wages of workers in
ongoing jobs, this ￿ exibilization may have a⁄ected ￿ uctuations in employment and other
macroeconomic aggregates. While one has to interpret these estimates with care given
the short period of data before 1984, they are consistent with studies that have pointed
towards changes on the labor market as the ultimate cause of the Great Moderation
(Gal￿ and Gambetti 2007) or have even attributed the Great Moderation to a reduction
in wage rigidity (Gourio 2007).
4 Implications for job creation and unemployment
What kind of models of labor market ￿ uctuations are consistent with the observed
behavior of wages? First of all, it must be that the labor market is subject to search
frictions. On a frictionless labor market, workers can be costlessly replaced so that each
worker is ￿ marginal￿and di⁄erences in the wage of newly hired workers and workers in
ongoing jobs cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. In this section we show that, in
addition to search frictions, we also need rigidity in the wages of workers of ongoing jobs
in order to match the low response of those wages to changes in productivity. We also
show that wages must be close to ￿ exible at the time of creation of a match to match
the response of wages of newly hired workers.
The type of wage rigidity we ￿nd to be consistent with the data (￿ exible at the
start of a match, rigid over the duration of the job) does not a⁄ect job creation and
17Ideally, we would like to compare the elasticities to those for the pre-1984 period, but since we have
only 5 years of data prior to 1984, this is infeasible.
15therefore is unlikely to explain the unemployment volatility puzzle. The basic intuition
for this result is that in search and matching models, as in all models with long term
employment relationships, the period wage is not allocative (Boldrin and Horvath 1995).
Labor market equilibrium determines the present value of these wage payments in a
match, but the path at which wages are paid out over the duration of the match is
irrelevant for job creation as long as the wage remains within the bargaining set and
does not violate the worker￿ s or ￿rm￿ s participation constraint (Hall 2005). This means
that wage rigidity matters only if it implies rigidity in the expected net present value of
wage payment at the start of a match (Shimer 2004).
4.1 Job creation on a frictional labor market
To illustrate this point, consider a standard search and matching model with aggregate
productivity shocks. Because we focus on job creation, we assume job destruction is
exogenous and constant, as in Pissarides (1985). We think of ￿ uctuations as being
driven by shocks to productivity, as in Shimer (2005).18 In this model, job creation is
determined by vacancy posting. Risk-neutral ￿rms may open a vacancy at cost c > 0
per period. With probability q (￿t), a ￿rm ￿nds a worker to ￿ll its vacancy, in which
case a match is formed. The worker ￿nding probability is strictly decreasing in labor
market tightness ￿t = vt=ut, where vt is the total number of vacancies in the economy
and ut is the unemployment rate. Matches produce output yt and the worker needs to
be paid a wage wt so that pro￿ts are yt￿wt in every period. With probability ￿ 2 (0;1),
matches are exogenously separated.
The decision how many vacancies to post is a trade-o⁄ between the vacancy posting
costs on the one hand and the expected net present value of pro￿ts on the other. This
trade-o⁄ is summarized by the job creation condition,19
c = q (￿t)
￿ yt ￿ ￿ wt
r + ￿
(5)
where r > 0 is the discount rate for future pro￿ts and ￿ yt and ￿ wt are the ￿ permanent￿











Notice that the ￿rm uses an e⁄ective discount rate of r+￿ because of the possibility that
the match is destroyed. When expected pro￿ts go up, ￿rms post more vacancies, which
18Our empirical results do not rely on this assumption. If business cycles were driven, for example, by
demand shocks, these shocks would still a⁄ect wages only through the productivity of labor. However,
in more general models the e⁄ect of wage rigidity on unemployment ￿ uctuations is less clear, because
there may be interaction e⁄ects with other frictions like nominal rigidities, see e.g. Thomas (2008).
19We write the model in discrete time but assume that all payments are made at the end of the period,
so that the expressions look similar to the continuous time representation.
20These are the constant levels for productivity and wages that give rise to the same expected net
present value as the actual levels. We borrow the term permanent levels from the consumption literature,
cf. permanent income.
16increases labor market tightness ￿t and therefore reduces the worker ￿nding probability
until in expectation pro￿ts are equal to the vacancy posting costs c again. The derivation
of equation (5) is standard; details may be found in Appendix C.1.
We now turn to the question what kind of wage determination mechanism we need
to assume in order to match our ￿ndings for the response of wages to changes in pro-
ductivity. If wages are rigid in the sense that the permanent wage ￿ wt does not increase
in response to an increase in (permanent) productivity ￿ yt, then pro￿ts and therefore
vacancy creation respond more strongly to this increase in productivity. Because we
can think of the job creation equation (5) as a labor demand curve, this is the sense in
which search models replicate the Walrasian intuition for why wage rigidity ampli￿es
unemployment ￿ uctuations. The di⁄erence with the Walrasian framework is that not
current pro￿ts yt ￿ wt matter for vacancy creation, but the expected net present value
of pro￿ts over the duration of the match.
4.2 Flexible wages
Because search frictions drive a wedge between the reservation wages of ￿rm and worker,
there is a positive surplus from a match. The standard assumption in the literature is
that each period, ￿rm and worker engage in (generalized) Nash bargaining over the
wage, so that each gets a ￿xed proportion of the surplus. Under this assumption, we
can derive the following wage curve or labor supply equation,
￿ wt = (1 ￿ ￿)b + ￿￿ yt + ￿c￿ ￿t (7)
where b is the value to the worker of being unemployed in each period, which includes
utility from leisure as well as the unemployment bene￿t, and ￿ is workers￿bargaining
power in the wage negotiations. The wage depends on labor market conditions because
of the worker￿ s outside option to look for another job. The derivation of equation (7)
is again standard, see Appendix C.2. Combined with the job creation equation (5), the
wage curve fully describes the equilibrium of the model.
If wage bargaining takes place in every period, the wage in this model is ￿ exible in
the sense that it immediately adjusts to changes in productivity and labor market condi-
tions. To explore the quantitative predictions of the ￿ exible wage model for the response
of wages to changes in productivity, we assume that yt follows an exogenous stochastic
process that is consistent with labor productivity data, and simulate the model. The
details of the calibration and simulation procedure are described in Appendix C.3. Since
some of the parameters are calibrated directly to data, we show only the model predic-
tions for di⁄erent values of the unemployment bene￿t b and workers￿bargaining power
￿, keeping the other calibration targets ￿xed at the values used by Shimer (2005).
The simulation results in Table 12 reveal several interesting patterns. First, the
elasticity of the wage of newly hired workers with respect to current productivity is very
close to the elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to permanent productivity for
all calibrations. Since we observe the former, but the latter matters for job creation, this
￿nding is encouraging in light of the exercise in this paper. (In section 4.3, we discuss
why the two elasticities are not exactly the same.)
17Second, we ￿nd that the response of the wage of newly hired workers is identical
to the response of the wage of job stayers to changes in productivity. This ￿nding is
not surprising. Since all ￿rms and all workers are identical, they have the same outside
options at each point in time. And since each ￿rm-worker pair bargains over the wage in
each period, they always agree on the same wage. This prediction of the model however,
is clearly at odds with our estimates.
Finally, the simulation results show that the elasticity of the wage with respect to
productivity is close to one for a wide range of parameter values. In models with a
frictionless labor market, this elasticity is always exactly equal to one if the expenditure
share on labor in the production function is constant. In that case, the marginal product
of labor is proportional to its average product, and the wage equals the marginal product.
However, on a labor market with search frictions, the wage is no longer equal to the
marginal product of labor. What we show here is that for a wide range of calibrations,
the wage is roughly proportional to the marginal product. This provides an intuitive
benchmark for the empirical results: in a model with ￿ exible wage setting, wages should
respond almost one-for-one to changes in labor productivity.21 And this prediction
is consistent with our estimate of the response of the wage of newly hired workers,
suggesting that wage setting is ￿ exible for those workers.
Summarizing, a model with search frictions on the labor market, but perfectly ￿ ex-
ible wage setting, predicts a response of wages of newly hired workers to changes in
productivity that is in line with our estimates. The model fails however, to capture the
substantially lower response of wages of workers in ongoing matches. This suggests that
wages in ongoing jobs are rigid. We now proceed to introduce this kind of wage rigidity
into the model.
4.3 Rigid wages in ongoing jobs
We maintain the assumption that wages are determined by Nash bargaining, but only
at the start of a match. Thereafter, wages are rigid so that they do not change much
anymore for the duration of the match. Under this assumption the wage curve is exactly
like (7). Notice that the permanent wage depends not only on current but also on
expected future labor market conditions, because by accepting a job the worker forfeits
the option value to ￿nd another job in the future. The fact that the period wage does
not appear in the equilibrium conditions for ￿t illustrates that the path at which wages
are paid is irrelevant for labor market tightness ￿t and therefore job creation. The period
wage is not determined in this model, unless we explicitly model the type of wage rigidity
we have in mind.
As an extreme case, assume that wages are perfectly rigid in ongoing jobs. This
is the model analyzed in Shimer (2004). As in that paper, we need to make an as-
21The only calibrations for which the elasticity is substantially smaller than one are very small values
of workers￿bargaining power as, for example, in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who calibrate ￿ to a
wage elasticity of 0:3. This calibration is ruled out by our estimates for the response of wages of newly
hired workers. Notice however, that this it is not crucial for their result that the ￿ exible wage model
can match the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Even with large values for ￿, the model can
generate large amounts of volatility as long as b is close enough to 1 so that the match surplus is small.
18sumption to avoid ine¢ cient match destruction. Shimer assumes that search frictions
are large enough that, given the stochastic process for labor productivity, the wage in
ongoing matches never hits the bounds of the bargaining set. Here, we make the simpler
assumption of full commitment on the part of both worker and ￿rm, so that matches
never get destroyed endogenously (as in the simple case in Rudanko 2008). This model
is relatively simple to solve. The simulation results are presented in Table 13.
Three main results follow from the simulations. First, wage rigidity in ongoing jobs
drives a wedge between wages of newly hired workers and of workers in ongoing jobs,
the latter now responding substantially less to changes in productivity than the former.
Second, some of the wage rigidity seems to ￿ spill over￿to newly hired workers and the
response of the wages of these workers to changes in productivity is now substantially
less than one. Third, this type of wage rigidity does not a⁄ect the response of the
permanent wage to changes in permanent productivity and therefore also does not a⁄ect
the volatility of job creation. We discuss each of these results in turn.
Since we assumed wages of workers in ongoing jobs to be rigid, it is not surprising
that the wage of this group of workers responds less to productivity than the wage of
newly hired workers, which is not subject to the rigidity. The only reason that the
elasticity for job stayers is not equal to zero is that the group of stayers changes over
time: this period job stayers includes last period￿ s new hires. But because the fraction of
new hires is small compared to the overall size of the labor force, this e⁄ect is small. The
much lower responsiveness of the wage of workers in ongoing jobs than the wage of new
hires to changes in productivity is consistent with our estimates, improving the ability of
the model to match the wage data compared to the model with perfectly ￿ exible wages.
To understand why the wage of newly hired workers responds less than one-for-one to
changes in productivity, despite the fact that wages setting is ￿ exible for these workers,












t denotes the wage of newly hired workers, so that dlogw0
t=dlogyt is the elas-
ticity of the wage of newly hired workers with respect to current productivity, which
we observe, and dlog ￿ wt=dlog ￿ yt is the elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to
permanent productivity, which determines ￿ uctuations in job creation. The elasticity of
the permanent wage di⁄ers from that of the wage of new hires by a factor that re￿ ects
the relative persistence in wages and productivity in ongoing jobs.
Since in this model the permanent wage equals the wage of new hires (since the wage
in a given job never changes anymore after the time of hiring), the numerator of this ratio
equals one. If productivity were a random walk, then ￿ yt = yt and the denominator would
be one as well. In that case, the observed elasticity of the wage of newly hired workers
would exactly re￿ ect the elasticity of the permanent wage. If there is mean reversion in
productivity, dlog ￿ yt=dlogyt is smaller than one, so that the observed elasticity provides
a lower bound for the elasticity of the permanent wage. This result is consistent with
Kudlyak (2007), who constructs an estimate for the permanent wage, which she calls
the ￿ wage component of the user cost of labor￿ , and ￿nds that ￿the wage component of
19the user cost is more cyclical than the wages of newly hired workers, which in turn are
more cyclical than the wages of all workers.￿
Equation (8) can also be used to explain why, in the ￿ exible wage model, the response
of the wage of new hires to changes in current productivity is close, but not exactly
equal, to the response of the permanent wage to changes in permanent productivity. In
that model, persistence in wages is equal to the persistence of the productivity process
plus any additional persistence coming from the model dynamics. But since the search
and matching model exhibits virtually no endogenous propagation, the ratio of the
persistence of wages over productivity is very close to one.
The model with perfectly rigid wages in ongoing jobs slightly underpredicts the
response of the wage of both workers in ongoing jobs (0:16) and new hires (0:65) to
changes in productivity compared to our estimates (0:25 and 0:79 respectively). There
are many reasons why wages in ongoing jobs would be less than perfectly rigid. One
possibility would be to relax the assumption of full commitment and assume that wages
in ongoing jobs are rebargained if but only if the wage hits the bounds of the bargaining
set, as in an earlier version of Hall￿ s (2005) paper. What is important for the argument
here, is that we match the response of wages to productivity, assuming that wages
are rigid only in ongoing jobs. As we argued in the introduction, this assumption is
consistent with most micro-foundations for wage rigidity.
Wage rigidity in ongoing jobs does not a⁄ect job creation. The reason is that job
creation, which is completely pinned down by equations (5) and (7), is a⁄ected only
by the permanent wage. And rigidity of the wage in ongoing jobs does not imply any
rigidity in the permanent wage. The intuition for this result is that equilibrium tightness
is determined by those ￿rms who have not yet found a worker and are deciding whether
or not to post a vacancy. These ￿rms are trading o⁄ payment of the search cost c with
the expected future pro￿ts after hiring a worker. What matters for these pro￿ts, is the
expected future wage payments to be made to the worker.
For comparison, we also present simulation results for a model with rigid wages at
the start of a match. Here, we think of wage rigidity as countercyclical bargaining power
of workers, as suggested by Shimer (2005). We model this in the simplest possible way,
by making ￿ depend negatively on the level of productivity, and calibrate the degree of
rigidity to match the response of job creation to changes in productivity. Without any
additional rigidity in wages of ongoing jobs, this model roughly matches the response of
the wage of workers in ongoing jobs but implies a much lower response of the wage of
newly hired workers than we ￿nd in the data.
4.4 The unemployment volatility puzzle
Wage rigidity in ongoing jobs, which is consistent with the wage data, does not a⁄ect
job creation and therefore does not generate more volatility in unemployment. What are
the implications of our results for the unemployment volatility puzzle more generally?
A useful starting point is to calculate the response of the job ￿nding rate to changes in
labor productivity from the job creation equation (5). Assume the matching function
is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale and let ￿ denote the share parameter of
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Two things matter for the volatility of the job ￿nding rate in response to productivity
shocks: the elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to permanent productivity,
and the size of permanent pro￿ts ￿ yt￿ ￿ wt. Our estimates indicate that the wage elasticity
dlog ￿ wt=dlog ￿ yt is close to one in the data.
There are two ways to interpret our results. First, one might conclude that wages
must be perfectly ￿ exible and so that the wage elasticity is virtually equal to one, as in
Table 13. This interpretation is certainly consistent with our estimates. In this case, the
response of the job ￿nding rate to changes in productivity in (9) reduces to (1 ￿ ￿)=￿.
The only parameter that matters for ￿ uctuations in job creation is the elasticity of the
matching function. Petrongolo and Pissarides survey empirical estimates of ￿ and ￿nd
that the share of unemployment in the matching function is no greater than 0:5. Thus,
the response of p(￿t) to changes in yt predicted by the model, is at most 1. In the
data, the ratio of the standard deviation of the job ￿nding rate p(￿t) over the standard
deviation of labor productivity yt is about 5:9. Thus, in this interpretation, the model
cannot be calibrated to match the volatility of job creation. Since (9) was derived only
from the job creation equation (5), which was derived without any assumptions on wage
determination or workers￿behavior, the only way to ￿x the model would be to change
modeling of labor demand side of the market.
Our estimates are consistent with an alternative interpretation as well. A value
for dlog ￿ wt=dlog ￿ yt that is close to, but not equal to one, cannot be rejected based on
our estimates. Thus, a moderate degree of wage rigidity, for example as implied by
the bargaining setup in Hall and Milgrom (2008), may help generate more volatility in
job creation. In this case, an alternative calibration may also contribute to solving the
puzzle. By making pro￿ts a very small share of total match output, the response of the
job ￿nding rate to changes in productivity as in equation (9) can be made arbitrarily
large. This is the intuition for why the small surplus calibration of Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) generates large ￿ uctuations in unemployment.
Finally, a generalization of the model that allows for endogenous job destruction
could contribute to the volatility of unemployment, although the contribution to ￿ uctu-
ations in job creation -if any- is likely to be small. Fujita and Ramey (2008), in response
to Shimer (2007), show that ￿ uctuations in the separation rate may explain up to 50%
of the volatility of unemployment. In our model, the separation rate is constant, so that
￿ uctuations in unemployment are attributed entirely to ￿ uctuations in the job ￿nding
rate by the following accounting identity.
ut+1 = ut + ￿ (1 ￿ ut) ￿ p(￿t)ut (10)
Since exogenous ￿ uctuations in the separation rate ￿t, imply a counterfactual positive
correlation between unemployment and vacancies (see e.g. Shimer 2005), the most
promising way to relax this assumption seems to be to endogenize job destruction,
21e.g. as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This raises the question whether wage
rigidity may a⁄ect job creation through its e⁄ect on job destruction, for example because
worker and ￿rm take into account the e⁄ect on the probability that their match will
be destroyed when they bargain over the wage at the start of the match. We argue
that this e⁄ect is likely to be small. First, it seems implausible on theoretical grounds
that wage rigidity would a⁄ect job destruction, since the e⁄ect would imply ine¢ cient
destruction of matches, i.e. separations that could be avoided by re-bargaining the wage
when necessary, see Hall (2005). Second, as shown by Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007)
and Pissarides (2007), while endogenous separations may have an important impact on
unemployment ￿ uctuations, this generalization of the model does not a⁄ect the dynamics
of labor market tightness. Since in this paper, we focus on the dynamics of job creation,
relaxing the assumption of an exogenous separation rate will not a⁄ect our results.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we construct an aggregate time series for the wage of workers newly hired
out of non-employment. We ￿nd that these wages of newly hired workers react one-to-
one to productivity ￿ uctuations, whereas wages of workers in ongoing job relationships
react very little to changes in productivity. Controlling for cyclical variation in the
skill composition of the workforce is important for this result, and we show that the
average skill level of the workforce is captured well by the average number of years of
education. Finally, we relate our ￿nding to existing studies on the cyclicality of wages
of job changers and show that wages of new hires out of non-employment behave similar
to wages of job-to-job movers.
Our results point agaist rigidity in the wage of newly hired workers as an explanation
for the volatility of unemployment over the business cycle as forwarded by Hall (2005),
Gertler and Trigari (2006) and Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008). However, a moderate degree
of wage rigidity or alternative calibrations as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) or Hall
and Milgrom (2008) are within the con￿dence interval of our estimates. Finally, our
baseline estimates are based on the post 1984 period and we ￿nd some evidence that
wages of newly hired workers were more rigid prior to that year.
A Description of the data
We use wage data for individual workers in the CPS outgoing rotation groups from 1979
to 2006. We match these workers to the three preceding basic monthly data￿les in order
to construct four months (one quarter) of employment history, which we use to identify
newly hired workers.
A.1 Wages from the CPS outgoing rotation groups
We consider only wage and salary workers that are not self-employed and report non-
zero earnings and hours worked. Both genders and all ages are included in our baseline
sample. Our wage measure is hourly earnings (on the main job) for hourly workers
22and weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for weekly workers. For weekly
workers who report that their hours vary (from 1994 onwards), we use hours worked
last week. Top-coded weekly earnings are imputed assuming a log-normal cross-sectional
distribution for earnings, following Schmitt (2003), who ￿nds that this method better
replicates aggregate wage series than multiplying by a ￿xed factor or imputing using
di⁄erent distributions. Notice that the imputation of top-coded earnings a⁄ects the
mean, but not the median wage.
Outliers introduce extra sampling variation. Therefore, we apply mild trimming to
the cross-sectional distribution of hours worked (lowest and highest 0.5 percentile) and
hourly wages (0.3 percentiles). These values roughly correspond to USD 1 per hour
and USD 100 per hour at constant 2002 dollars, the values recommended by Schmitt
(2003). We prefer trimming by quantiles rather than absolute levels because (i) it is
symmetric and therefore does not a⁄ect the median, (ii) it is not a⁄ected by real wage
growth and (iii) it is not a⁄ected by increased wage dispersion over the sample period.
We also check that our results are robust to using median wages, which are less a⁄ected
by outliers.
We do not correct wages for overtime, tips and commissions, because (i) the relevant
wage for our purposes is the wage paid by employers, which includes these secondary
bene￿ts, (ii) the data necessary to do this are not available over the whole sample period,
and (iii) this correction has very little e⁄ect on the average wage (Schmitt 2003). We
also do not exclude allocated earnings because (i) doing so might bias our estimate for
the average wage and (ii) allocation ￿ ags are not available for all years and (iii) even
if they are only about 25% of allocated observations are ￿ agged as such (Hirsch and
Schumacher 2004).
Mean and median wages in a given month are weighted by the appropriate sampling
weights (the earnings weights for the outgoing rotation groups) and by hours worked,
following Abraham et al. (1999) and Schmitt (2003). We explore robustness to the
weights and con￿rm the ￿nding of these papers that hours weighted series better replicate
the aggregate wage. Average mean or median wages in a quarter are simple averages of
the monthly mean or median wages. Consistent with the literature, we consider mean
log wages rather than log mean wages.
In order to correct the business cycle statistics for the wage for sampling error (see
Appendix B), we calculate standard errors for mean and median wages. Standard errors
for the mean are simply the standard deviation of the wage divided by the square root of
the number of observations. Medians are also asymptotically normal, but their variance
is downward biased in small samples. Therefore, we bootstrap these standard errors.
We seasonally adjust our wage series by regressing the log wage on quarter dummies.
Nominal wages are de￿ ated by the implicit de￿ ator for hourly earnings in the private
non-farm business sector (chain-weighted) from the BLS productivity and costs program.
Using di⁄erent de￿ ators a⁄ects the results very little, but decreases the correlation of
our wage series with the aggregate wage.
Our baseline sample includes non-supervisory workers in the private non-farm busi-
ness sector. This subsample of workers gives the best replication of the aggregate wage
23in terms of its correlation with hourly compensation from the establishment survey and
in terms of its volatility, persistence and comovement with other variables.22 We iden-
tify private sector workers using reported ￿ class of worker￿ . We construct an industry
classi￿cation that is consistent over the whole sample period (building on the NBER
consistent industry classi￿cation but extending it for data from 2003 onwards) and use
it to identify farm workers. Similarly, we identify supervisory workers using reported
occupation. Because of the change in the BLS occupation classi￿cation in 2003, there
is a slight jump in the fraction of supervisory workers from 2002:IV to 2003:I. It is not
possible to distinguish supervisory workers in agriculture or the military, so all workers
in these sectors are excluded in the wage series for non-supervisory workers.
Finally, in order to control for composition bias because of heterogeneous work-
ers (see section 2.2), we need additional worker characteristics to use in a Mincerian
earnings regression. Dummies for females, blacks, hispanics and married workers (with
spouse present) are, or can be made, consistent over the sample period. We construct a
consistent education variable in ￿ve categories as well as an almost consistent measure
for years of schooling following Jaeger (1997) and calculate potential experience as age
minus years of schooling minus six.
A.2 Identifying newly hired workers
We match the individuals in the outgoing rotation groups to the three preceding basic
monthly data ￿les using the household identi￿er, household number (for multiple house-
holds on one address), person line number (for multiple wage earners in one household),
month-in-sample and state. To identify mismatches, we use the sjrja criterion proposed
by Madrian and Lefgren (2000): a worker is ￿ agged as a mismatch if gender or race
changes between two subsequent months or if the di⁄erence in age is less than 0 or
greater than 2 (to allow for some measurement error in the reported age). Madrian and
Lefgren show that this criterion performs well in the trade-o⁄ between false matches
and false mismatches. Within the set of measures that they ￿nd to perform well, sjrja
is the strictest. We choose a strict criterion because mismatches are more likely to be
classi￿ed as newly hired workers (see below) and are therefore likely to a⁄ect our results
substantially.
We can credibly match about 80% of workers in the outgoing rotation group to all
three preceding monthly ￿les. Because of changes in the sample design, we cannot match
su¢ ciently many individuals to the preceding four months in the third and fourth quarter
of 1985 and in the third and fourth quarter of 1995, so that the wage series for validly
matched workers, job stayers and new hires have missing values in those quarters. In our
regressions, we weight quarters by the variance of the estimate for the mean or median
wage so that quarters with less than average number of observations automatically get
less weight.
Including the outgoing rotation group itself, the matched data include four months
employment history (employed, unemployed or not-in-the-labor-force), which we obtain
22Detailed results for this replication exercise are available in a previous version of this paper (July
2007), available from our websites.
24from the BLS labor force status recode variable. We use this employment history to
identify newly hired workers and workers in ongoing job relationships. New hires are
de￿ned as workers that were either unemployed or not in the labor force for any of the
preceding three months. Job stayers are identi￿ed as workers that were employed for
all four months. Notice that the two groups are not comprehensive for the group of
all workers, because workers that cannot be matched to all preceding months can not
always be classi￿ed.
B Correcting business cycle statistics for sampling error
We estimate wages for all workers, job stayers and new hires from an underlying micro-
data survey. Therefore, our wage series are subject to sampling error. Given the way we
construct these series, we know three things about the sampling error. First, because
there is no overlap between individuals included in the outgoing rotation groups in two
subsequent quarters, the sampling error is uncorrelated over time.23 Second, because
the sampling error in each period is the error associated with estimating a mean (or
median), it is asymptotically normally distributed. Third, we have an estimate for the
standard deviation of the sampling error in each quarter, which is given by the standard
error of the mean (or median) wage in that quarter. Notice that taking ￿rst di⁄erence
exacerbates the measurement error, increasing the standard deviation by a factor
p
2.
Because of these three properties, and because the estimated standard errors are stable
over time, we can treat the sampling error as classical measurement error, which is
independent and identically distributed.
Let wt denote an estimated wage series, wt = w￿
t + "t, where w￿
t is the true wage
and "t is the sampling error in the wage, which is uncorrelated over time and with w￿
t
and has a known variance ￿2. The business cycle statistics we consider are the standard
deviation of w￿
t, the autocorrelation of w￿
t and the correlation of w￿
t with xt, an aggregate
variable that is not subject to measurement error. These statistics can be calculated
from the estimated wage series wt and the estimated standard deviation of the sampling
error ￿ as follows.
var(wt) = var(w￿
t) + ￿2 ) sd(w￿
t) =
p
R ￿ sd(wt) (11)























23Individuals in the CPS are interviewed four months in a row, the last one of which is an outgoing
rotation group, then leave the sample for eight months, after which they are interviewed another four
months, the last one of which is again an outgoing rotation group. Therefore, about half of the sample in
quarter t (individuals in rotation group 8) is also included in the sample in quarter t￿4 (when they were
in rotation group 4) and the other half is included in the sample in quarter t + 4. Thus, the sampling
error may be correlated with a four quarter lag, but not between subsequent quarters. We ignore this




=var(wt) 2 (0;1) is the fraction of signal in the variance of
wt. Unless explicitly speci￿ed, we use the correction factors
p
R, 1=R and 1=
p
R for
all reported business cycle statistics. This bias correction is small for the wages of all
workers and job stayers, because sample sizes are large and therefore ￿2 is small, but
substantial for the wage of new hires. Notice that the bias correction decreases the
reported standard deviations towards zero but increases the reported autocovariances
and correlation coe¢ cients away from zero. For bandpass ￿ltered series no correction is
necessary because the ￿lter removes the high-frequency ￿ uctuations due to measurement
error from the data. Regression coe¢ cients for the wage on labor productivity are not
biased in the presence of classical measurement error in the dependent variable so no
correction is necessary.
C Details about the model in section 4
C.1 Derivation of the job creation equation
Free entry drives the value of a vacancy to zero, which implies that the period cost c
must equal the probability that the vacancy transforms in a match times the expected
value of that match.
c = q (￿t)EtJt+1 (14)
The value to the ￿rm of having a ￿lled job Jt, is given by the following Bellman equation.
(1 + r)Jt = yt ￿ wt + (1 ￿ ￿)EtJt+1: (15)
Solving equation (15) forward gives an expression for the value of a ￿lled job.
EtJt+1 =
￿ yt ￿ ￿ wt
r + ￿
(16)
Substituting (16) into (14) gives the job creation equation in the main text.
C.2 Derivation of the wage equation
The derivation of the wage curve (Equation 7) follows Pissarides (2000, section 1.4).
Here the steps are slightly di⁄erent because we consider a stochastic version of the
search model. First of all, it is convenient to note, that Nash bargaining implies




To derive the wage equation, start from the Bellman equation for the value of being
unemployed.
(1 + r)Ut = b + ￿tq (￿t)EtWt+1 + ((1 ￿ ￿tq (￿t))EtUt+1 (18)
Rearrange to obtain:
EtUt+1 ￿ (1 + r)Ut = ￿b ￿ ￿tq (￿t)Et (Wt+1 ￿ EtUt+1) (19)
26Now use (17) to replace the worker surplus on the right-hand side of the equation. Then
use (14) to replace the value of a job.











This equation will be useful momentarily.
Next consider the Bellman equation for having a job.
(1 + r)Wt = wt + (1 ￿ ￿)EtWt+1 + ￿EtUt+1 (21)
Subtract (1 + r)Ut from both sides to obtain:
(1 + r)(Wt ￿ Ut) = wt + (1 ￿ ￿)Et (Wt+1 ￿ Ut+1) + EtUt+1 ￿ (1 + r)Ut (22)
Now replace the last two terms using (20) and rearrange,




solve forward and substitute the de￿nitions of ￿ wt and ￿ ￿t, to get an expression for the
worker￿ s surplus of being in a match.




Again using Nash bargaining (17) and eliminating Jt+1 using (16), we get,
￿
1 ￿ ￿




which after solving for ￿ wt gives equation (7) in the main text.
C.3 Numerical solution and simulations
Because these more general models can no longer be solved analytically, we simulate
them. We assume (as in Shimer 2005), that labor productivity follows an AR(1) type
process, bounded below by the ￿ ow utility of unemployment.
yt = b + ezt (1 ￿ b) (26)
zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t (27)




of the model parameters is identical to Shimer (2005). As an alternative we present
results for a small surplus calibration in the spirit of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
The vacancy posting cost is chosen to yield steady state tightness of unity. We simulate
the model at a weekly frequency and aggregate to quarterly observations. The reported
elasticities are averages over 1000 simulations of length 89.
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31Table 1: Worker characteristics, sample averages
All workers New hires
Percentage of female workers 44.0 44.9
Percentage of African-Americans 11.5 15.2
Percentage of hispanics 9.5 15.0
Education (years of schooling) 13.4 12.2
Experience (years) 20.5 20.1
The sample includes all individuals in the CPS over the period 1984￿ 2006 who are
employed in the private non-farm business sector and are between 25 and 60 years old
(men and women), excluding supervisory workers. Experience is potential labor market
experience: age minus years of schooling minus 6.
Table 2: Volatility of wages at business cycle frequencies
BP ￿lter HP ￿lter
Relative Auto Relative Auto
std. dev. correl. std. dev. correl.
Aggregate wage 1951-2001 0.41 0.92 0.43 0.91
1984-2006 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.93
CPS, all workers 1984-2006 0.44 0.91 0.67 0.92
CPS, new hires 1984-2006 0.68 0.80 1.09 0.71
The aggregate wage is hourly compensation in the private non-farm business sector
from the BLS productivity and cost program. Wages from the CPS are averages for all
employed workers in the private non-farm business sector between 25 and 60 years old,
excluding supervisory workers, corrected for composition bias as described in the main
text. All series in logs. Bandpass ￿ltered data include ￿ uctuations with periodicities
between 6 and 32 quarters. HP ￿ltered data use a smoothing parameter of 100,000. In
the CPS wage series the moments have been corrected for sampling error as described
in Appendix B.
32Table 3: Reponse of wages of job stayers to unemployment
2-step est. 1-step est. 2-step est. 2-step est.
￿rst di⁄. levels controls
Elasticity wrt productivity -0.81 -0.81 -0.37 -0.80
Std. error 0.20 0.19 0.62 0.20
Observations 42164
Elasticities are estimated using annual panel data from the PSID, 1979-1991. The es-
timates in the ￿rst column replicate those reported in Devereux (2001), applying his
2-step procedure. In the ￿rst step, individual-speci￿c ￿rst di⁄erences of the wage are
regressed on time dummies. In the second step, the coe¢ cients of these time dummies
are regressed on the change in the national unemployment rate. This 2-step procedure
can be replicated in one step, clustering the standard errors by quarter (column 2). In
the third column we regress the log of the average wage on time dummies and then
regress the coe¢ cients of these dummies on the unemployment rate in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The fourth column reports the results of our 2-step procedure, which includes individ-
ual characteristics (years of education, a fourth order polynomial in experience, and
dummies for gender, race, marital status) as control variables in the ￿rst step.
Table 4: Response of wages to productivity
Wage per hour Earnings per person
All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.24 0.79 0.37 0.83
Std. error 0.14 0.40 0.17 0.51
Observations 1566161 117243 1566161 117243
Quarters 83 83 83 83
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. The number
of observations is the number of individual workers in the ￿rst step. Labor productivity
is output per our in the non-farm business sector from the BLS productivity and cost
program. For the hourly wage we use labor productivity per hour and for regressions
of earnings per person we use labor productivity per person. The second step includes
seasonal dummies.
33Table 5: Robustness to alternative estimators
Wage per hour Earnings per person
WLS All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.25 0.79 0.36 0.86
Std. error 0.14 0.40 0.17 0.50
Median All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.13 0.89 0.15 0.56
Std. error 0.20 0.45 0.24 0.70
Median, WLS All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.11 0.89 -0.05 0.57
Std. error 0.24 0.49 0.22 0.72
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. WLS weights
the second step regression by the inverse of the variance of the ￿rst step estimates.
Median uses the median wages instead of mean wages by quarter.
Table 6: Robustness to alternative sample selection criteria
Wage per hour Earnings per person
Including supervisory workers All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.10 0.57 0.39 0.70
Std. error 0.13 0.40 0.18 0.49
Including public sector All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.06 0.70 0.33 0.57
Std. error 0.12 0.48 0.15 0.54
New hires out of unemployment All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.24 0.77 0.37 0.69
Std. error 0.14 0.55 0.17 0.70
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. The table
compares the results for di⁄erent compositions of the sample from which the CPS wages
are constructed.
34Table 7: Worker heterogeneity and composition bias
Wage per hour Earnings per person
No controls for skill All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.14 0.67 0.27 0.73
Std. error 0.15 0.41 0.18 0.50
No controls for experience All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.26 0.91 0.40 0.94
Std. error 0.14 0.42 0.17 0.53
No controls for education All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.16 0.54 0.30 0.58
Std. error 0.15 0.40 0.18 0.48
Only controls for education All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.22 0.92 0.35 0.98
Std. error 0.14 0.44 0.17 0.53
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. The table
compares the results for varying speci￿cations of the ￿rst step regression. The ￿rst
speci￿cation excludes all controls for individual characteristics from the regression. The
second and third speci￿cation omit controls for labor market experience and education,
respectively. The fourth speci￿cation omits controls for both experience and demography
but includes controls for education.
Table 8: Di⁄erences across gender and age groups
Men and women Men only
Age: 25 ￿60 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.24 0.79 0.26 1.29
Std. error 0.14 0.40 0.14 0.55
Age: 20 ￿60 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.17 0.34 0.21 0.71
Std. error 0.13 0.35 0.13 0.47
Age: 25 ￿65 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.23 0.70 0.25 1.15
Std. error 0.13 0.40 0.14 0.56
Age: 30 ￿45 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.13 0.70 0.20 1.72
Std. error 0.17 0.62 0.19 0.71
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. The table
compares the results for di⁄erent compositions of the sample from which the CPS wages
are constructed, varying gender and age ranges.
35Table 9: Exogenous changes in productivity
Wage per hour Earnings per person
Corrected labor productivity All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.33 1.07 0.43 1.00
Std. error 0.18 0.47 0.19 0.55
TFP All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.26 1.03 0.33 0.82
Std. error 0.19 0.48 0.20 0.55
TFP, corr. for factor utilization All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.19 1.06 0.29 1.07
Std. error 0.18 0.58 0.23 0.70
Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described in the text. The table
compares the results for varying measures of productivity in the second step regression.
The ￿rst speci￿cation uses a rough measure of TFP, log output minus 1 ￿ ￿ times log
hours worked, where 1 ￿ ￿ is the labor share in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
The second and third speci￿cations use the quarterly version of the Basu, Fernald and
Kimball (2006) productivity series. In all cases, these productivity measures are used
to instrument labor productivity.
Table 10: Response of wages of job-to-job movers
PSID, 1970-1991 All workers New hires Job changers
Elasticity wrt unemployment -1.01 -2.43
Std. error 0.21 0.68
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.43 0.96
Std. error 0.21 0.74
Observations 52525 6406
Years 21 21
CPS, 1994-2006 All workers New hires Job changers
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.42 -1.31 -2.02
Std. error 0.54 1.74 2.09
Observations 863600 62753 57619
Quarters 45 45 45
The table compares the response of the average wage of job changers to the average
wage for all workers and for new hires. The estimates from the PSID use Devereux￿ s
(2001) annual data, take individual-speci￿c ￿rst di⁄erences and include a linear time
trend. The estimates from the CPS are estimated using the two-step method described
in the text. In order to be consistent with the other estimates in this paper, job stayers
include job-to-job movers.
36Table 11: Wage rigidity before the Great Moderation
Wage per hour Earnings per person
1984-2006 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.24 0.79 0.37 0.83
Std. error 0.14 0.40 0.17 0.51
1979-2006 All workers New hires All workers New hires
Elasticity wrt productivity 0.18 0.49 0.20 0.30
Std. error 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.35
The table compares the results for our baseline sample of post 1984 data to the full
sample starting in 1979. Elasticities are estimated using the two-step method described
in the text.


















0.200 0.050 0.727 1.126 0.732 0.646 0.650 1.171 1.171 0.240
0.200 0.100 0.843 1.300 0.845 0.648 0.650 1.191 1.192 0.243
0.200 0.300 0.951 1.464 0.951 0.649 0.650 1.221 1.221 0.250
0.200 0.500 0.978 1.505 0.978 0.650 0.650 1.231 1.231 0.251
0.200 0.700 0.990 1.524 0.990 0.650 0.650 1.236 1.236 0.252
0.200 0.900 0.997 1.535 0.997 0.650 0.650 1.239 1.239 0.254
0.400 0.050 0.592 0.920 0.598 0.643 0.650 1.561 1.561 0.319
0.400 0.100 0.751 1.160 0.754 0.647 0.650 1.588 1.588 0.324
0.400 0.300 0.919 1.415 0.920 0.649 0.650 1.627 1.627 0.333
0.400 0.500 0.963 1.483 0.964 0.650 0.650 1.641 1.642 0.335
0.400 0.700 0.984 1.514 0.984 0.650 0.650 1.647 1.647 0.338
0.400 0.900 0.996 1.532 0.996 0.650 0.650 1.652 1.653 0.338
0.600 0.050 0.499 0.777 0.505 0.642 0.650 2.341 2.342 0.479
0.600 0.100 0.677 1.047 0.680 0.646 0.650 2.381 2.381 0.486
0.600 0.300 0.889 1.369 0.890 0.649 0.650 2.443 2.444 0.499
0.600 0.500 0.949 1.461 0.949 0.650 0.650 2.462 2.463 0.503
0.600 0.700 0.977 1.504 0.978 0.650 0.650 2.471 2.472 0.505
0.600 0.900 0.994 1.530 0.994 0.650 0.650 2.478 2.478 0.507
0.800 0.050 0.431 0.672 0.437 0.641 0.650 4.684 4.686 0.957
0.800 0.100 0.616 0.954 0.620 0.646 0.650 4.761 4.763 0.975
0.800 0.300 0.861 1.327 0.862 0.649 0.650 4.878 4.880 0.998
0.800 0.500 0.935 1.440 0.936 0.649 0.650 4.921 4.923 1.007
0.800 0.700 0.971 1.494 0.971 0.650 0.650 4.945 4.948 1.011
0.800 0.900 0.992 1.527 0.992 0.650 0.650 4.949 4.951 1.013
0.980 0.050 0.384 0.600 0.390 0.640 0.650 46.749 46.782 9.542
0.980 0.100 0.570 0.884 0.574 0.645 0.649 47.518 47.554 9.721
0.980 0.300 0.837 1.291 0.839 0.648 0.650 48.772 48.811 9.979
0.980 0.500 0.923 1.422 0.924 0.649 0.649 49.103 49.144 10.046
0.980 0.700 0.966 1.487 0.966 0.649 0.650 49.352 49.392 10.107
0.980 0.900 0.991 1.525 0.991 0.650 0.650 49.486 49.528 10.129
The table reports simulated elasticities for di⁄erent calibrations of the model. We vary
the ￿ ow value of unemployment b and workers￿bargaining power ￿. Other parameters
are calibrated as in Shimer (2005). The reported elasticities are averages of 1000 sim-
ulations of 89 quarters. All simulated data are in log ￿rst di⁄erences. The model is
simulated at weekly frequency and aggregated to quarterly data before computing the
statistics. In bold face the calibrations of Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). w is the average wage in the model, y is average productivity, ￿ w and ￿ y are the
permanent values of these variables (see section 4.2), ￿ is labor market tightness and ￿x
denotes the standard deviation of variable x.














Shimer, AER calibration 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.986 1.646 0.413
Small surplus calibration 0.384 0.389 0.389 0.389 46.516 11.706
Countercyclical bargaining power 0.601 0.228 0.228 0.228 24.028 6.002
On-the-job wage rigidity 0.985 0.648 0.159 0.163 1.646 0.413
The table reports simulated elasticities for di⁄erent models, varying the type of wage
rigidity. Parameters are calibrated as in Shimer (2005), except for the small surplus
calibration where the ￿ ow utility of unemployment is 0:98 of per period productivity
and the worker bargaining power is 0:05. In each simulation the vacancy posting cost is
chosen to normalize steady state labor market tightness to unity. The reported elastic-
ities are averages of 1000 simulations of 89 quarters. All simulated data are in log ￿rst
di⁄erences. The models are simulated at weekly frequency and aggregated to quarterly
data before computing the statistics.












1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Fraction of newly hired workers among employed workers
The graph presents the number of new hires as a fraction of the total number of employed
workers. The sample includes all individuals in the CPS who are employed in the private
non-farm business sector and are between 25 and 60 years of age (men and women),
excluding supervisory workers. New hires are workers that were non-employed at least
once within the previous 3 months. The gaps in the graph are quarters when it is not
possible to identify newly hired workers, see Appendix A. The grey areas indicate NBER
recessions.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Fraction of married among newly hired workers and all workers
The green dotted line is the average for all workers and the blue solid line for new hires.
Education coding changes in 1992. In order not to loose that observation, we regressed
the average education level in the sample on a third order polynomial in time and a post
1992 dummy and took the residuals, adding back up the polynomial but not the dummy
to correct the resulting level shift. The sample includes all individuals in the CPS who
are employed in the private non-farm business sector and are between 25 and 60 years
of age (men and women), excluding supervisory workers. New hires are workers that
were non-employed at least once within the previous 3 months. The gaps in the graph
are quarters when it is not possible to identify newly hired workers, see Appendix A.
The grey areas indicate NBER recessions.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Wage for newly hired workers and all workers, BP 3206
The blue solid line reports the cyclical component of the wage for the corresponding
subgroup of workers: workers in ongoing jobs in the top row or new hires in the bottom
row. The green line presents the average wage for all workers for comparison. The
graphs in the left column control for composition bias as described in the main text,
the graphs in the right column present the raw wage data. The cyclical component has
been extracted from the wage series using a bandpass ￿lter and shows ￿ uctuations with
periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters. The sample includes all individuals in the CPS
who are employed in the private non-farm business sector and are between 25 and 60
years of age (men and women), excluding supervisory workers. New hires are workers
that were non-employed at least once within the previous 3 months. The gaps in the
graph are quarters when it is not possible to identify newly hired workers, see Appendix
A. The grey areas indicate NBER recessions.
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